EU and Japan, often opt for procuring non-biotech ingredients so that their products do not have to carry a label: "may contain GMOs."
These developments present both an opportunity and a challenge for the grains and oilseeds sector. The U.S. industry perspective is that market-based programs (including identity preservation (IP) and third-party process verification) are more efficient means of marketing value-enhanced commodities in general and non-biotech products in particular than government regulation, including U.S. grain grades and standards.
2 Because the U.S. grain marketing system is characterized by high-volume, high-speed operations for bulk commodities, relatively high purity levels (e.g., 95%) of non-biotech corn and soybeans can only be sustained through IP systems, which will likely create additional costs.
Despite their importance, little is understood about price premiums that buyers are willing to pay for non-biotech corn and soybeans in domestic and foreign markets, or how premiums respond to changes in IP systems or other factors (such as the exchange rate for the dollar) over time.
Whether or not buyers are willing to pay premiums for non-biotech crops appears to depend critically on the share of non-biotech supply relative to the share of non-biotech demand. The next question of concern is: would the price premium be large enough to cover the cost of IP and 2 IP, for purposes of this study, is broadly defined as a production-handling-distribution process by which crops are required to be kept separate to avoid commingling during planting, harvesting, loading and unloading, storage, and transportation throughout the entire supply chain so as to preserve the crops' identities in terms of end-use quality, genetic makeup, or unique production process (such as organic farming). In contrast, segregation entails many of the above activities at any stage of the marketing chain, but does not necessarily preserve the crops' identities. Segregation to meet a stringent threshold level of biotech material in grain shipments, such as 1-percent in the EU or lower, is generally regarded as difficult and prohibitively expensive if not impossible.
to entice producers to grow non-biotech crops? If the U.S. grain marketing system is efficient, knowledge about potential price premiums can be supplemented by inferences about the distribution of costs.
This study focuses on the economics of segregating U.S. non-biotech corn and soybeans for shipments to Japan, the primary export market for U.S. non-biotech grains and oilseeds, as a case study. The purposes of this paper are two-fold: 1) to estimate price premiums that buyers in both the U.S. domestic and Japanese export markets were willing to pay for non-biotech corn and soybeans for the 2000-2002 crops; and 2) to examine who bears the cost of segregation. The IP systems used to segregate non-biotech corn and soybeans are intended to meet a less stringent, 5-percent tolerance level, not zero tolerance. In addition to shipments to Japan, these IP systems can be employed for shipments to other export markets.
Non-biotech Corn and Soybean Markets
At present, non-biotech corn and soybeans grown and marketed under IP systems remain a niche market. Non-biotech, IP corn and soybeans each account for about 2 percent of U.S. production (Lin, 2002) . Non-biotech corn and soybeans are basically an extension of value-enhanced crops, such as high-oil and white corn, which are typically grown by producers under contract with grain companies.
Japan is the primary export market for both U.S. non-biotech corn and soybeans, according to grain trade sources (table 1) . 3 In the marketing year of 2001/02, U.S. exports of non-biotech corn totaled about 2.1-2.6 million metric tons (mmt), 95 percent of which were shipped to Japan for food manufacturing (primarily starch). The StarLink incident in late 2000 triggered a significant increase in non-biotech corn exports to Japan in 2001/02. Similarly, U.S. exports of non-biotech soybeans totaled about 0.8-1.2 mmt, predominantly exported to Japan for the production of processed foods (such as tofu, miso, and soy sauce). The 0.7-1.0 mmt exports to Japan include non-biotech soybeans shipped as a bulk commodity (but intended to meet a 5% threshold level of biotech content) or by containers, as well as organic soybeans (table 1) .
Changing sentiment towards biotech products among some consumers and the decision of food manufacturers to avoid using biotech ingredients in the production of 26 food items governed by the Japanese labeling regulations are the two major driving forces behind the importation of nonbiotech corn and soybeans into Japan. 4 In 2001/02, non-biotech exports accounted for 14-17 percent of U.S. corn exports to Japan and 19-27 percent of U.S. soybean exports to that country.
Small volumes were exported to South Korea and the EU in the case of non-biotech soybeans and to South Korea in the case of non-biotech corn.
5
In addition to meeting the needs of export markets, U.S. grain handlers also separate non-biotech from biotech crops through IP for meeting the needs of some domestic food processors. Over the past few years, a few food manufacturers have decided to end the use of biotech crops in 3 Many grain companies choose not to ship to countries with very low threshold levels of biotech content, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia, because of high risk of liability, which makes the cost of IP prohibitively expensive. 4 Japan began implementing its mandatory labeling regulations for biotech foods in April 2001. 5 According to Toepfer International, market demand for non-biotech, IP food soybeans in the EU totaled about 100,000 metric tons in 2000/01, mostly imported from the United States for making tofu. their operations. In July 1999, the Gerber and Heinz companies announced that their baby food processing facilities would immediately stop using biotech ingredients. In January 2000, Bestfoods, Inc. decided to reformulate its food products destined for the EU by not using biotech ingredients in order to avoid the biotech labeling requirement (Howie) . Then, in February 2000, Frito-Lay Inc. announced that it would replace biotech corn in its snack food manufacturing with non-biotech corn. The volume of non-biotech corn used annually by these food manufacturers is estimated to lie between 0.5 mmt and 1.0 mmt. Frito-Lay alone used about 21.4 million bushels (0.5 mmt) of corn in producing processed foods in 1999 (Koenig) .
Identity Preservation Systems and Costs
Because of limited demand for non-biotech corn and soybeans and the additional expense of maintaining separate handling and storage facilities or cleaning the existing infrastructure, only a small to modest percentage of grain elevators segregate and market non-biotech products based on IP systems.
Modern biotechnology has and will continue to challenge the U.S. grain marketing system, particularly in terms of increased need for product differentiation. In September 1999, Sparks
Companies, Inc. conducted a survey of 100 Midwestern grain elevators and found that 11 percent were segregating for non-biotech corn and 8 percent for non-biotech soybeans. In The non-biotech niche market is defined by IP systems with contracts that specify the purity of non-biotech content in corn or soybean shipments so as to meet particular needs. Some U.S.
grain handlers are already segregating grain for certain export markets. For example, Cargill segregates non-biotech corn under Innovasure, a so-called process-based IP system, for Japan, although without guaranteeing a specific tolerance level for biotech material. The company provides its own verification process for the IP program in many cases, similar to that used for high oil corn (HOC). Patterning corn segregation after handling procedures for HOC can usually meet the 95-percent purity requirement of Japanese buyers (Lin, Chambers and Harwood) . Thus, the process has remained the core procedure for segregating non-biotech corn in recent years.
Other IP systems, such as the one designed by the Association of Official Seed Certifying Agencies (AOSCA) aim to achieve a certain purity level of non-biotech content, such as a 99-percent purity level for non-biotech corn. This is generally referred to as content-based (or standards-based) IP.
To ensure the achievement of a given purity, grain companies often contract with producers to plant certain varieties (e.g., non-biotech and EU-approved) for non-biotech corn IP programs. In addition, the programs require that equipment--such as planters, combines, dump pits, grain conveyers, dryers, and storage bins--be cleaned between crops. Contract producers are also required to adopt specific production and harvesting practices. For example, a distance of 660 feet from any biotech corn field is required to isolate a non-biotech corn field and avoid inadvertent cross-pollination from neighboring biotech corn. In addition, the programs involve testing the purity level of seed purchased by producers and biotech content of corn shipments as well as auditing and certification. Moreover, the programs often require detailed record keeping and retention of samples from the purchased seed, harvested crops, and corn shipments.
The IP system for non-biotech soybeans has changed more drastically in recent years. In the 2000 crop year, the Synchrony-treated soybeans (STS) IP system was a common segregation process with rigid requirements. STS are herbicide-tolerant, but non-biotech varieties developed Japanese buyers' unwillingness to pay premiums at the previous level due to STS' very low level of protein content. 6 Many soybean producers did not receive the premiums promised in the contracts because their shipments failed to meet the IP requirements. As a result, they changed to non-STS IP systems, typically resembling the HOC IP system, which is less rigid than the STS system.
Costs of Segregation
The cost of segregation depends on the requirements of the IP system that is designed to preserve the identity of the product, including the purity level of non-biotech content. Hence, the cost of segregation is particular to a specific IP system. If an IP system is changed, such as when the HOC system is applied to 2001 non-biotech soybeans rather than the STS system, then the cost will change accordingly to reflect the new set of requirements.
An earlier ERS study examines the cost of segregation for non-biotech crops based on a survey of U.S. grain elevators and specialty grain firms conducted by the University of Illinois (Bender et al.) . The ERS study indicates that, on average, segregation could add about $0.22 per bushel (12% of the average corn farm price) to the cost of handling non-biotech corn from country elevators to export elevators if segregation follows the HOC system (Lin, 2002) . The ERS cost estimate is comparable to that reported by other researchers or the grain handling industry, which is typically around $0.20/bu. (Miranowski, et al.; Lence and Hayes; Moss, Schmitz, and Schmitz; and Krejci) . The ERS study also estimated that, on average, segregation could add about $0.54 per bushel (12% of the average soybean farm price) to the cost of handling nonbiotech soybeans from country elevators to export elevators if segregation follows the STS system. In contrast, the cost of segregation could decline to $0.18 per bushel (4% of the soybean farm price) if segregation follows the same handling process used for HOC.
The above segregation costs were reaffirmed by analysts of the U.S. grain industry, Japanese grain trading houses, and companies directly involved in implementing non-biotech IP programs.
For example, Protein Technologies International estimated the cost of segregation for 2001 nonbiotech soybeans at $0.18 per bushel from country elevators to export elevators. Of the total $0.18/bu along that marketing chain, $0.01 arose at country elevators, another $0.10 was assessed between country elevators and river elevators, and $0.07 was incurred between river elevators and port elevators (Schmalz) . In terms of the nature of the segregation costs, about one-third is hidden cost (e.g., the opportunity cost of leaving storage bins partially filled or interest expense due to the delay of loading non-biotech soybeans onto vessels) and the remaining two-thirds are real, additional costs of segregation.
In most cases, shipping non-biotech soybeans from U.S. export ports to final destinations in Japan would not add extra ocean freight expenses. Non-biotech soybeans accounted for 19-27 percent of total U.S. soybean exports to Japan, making it likely to be shipped in larger volumes.
A volume greater than 8,000-9,000 tons does not require separate holds on the vessel and thus does not lead to additional ocean freight expenses (Nishiyi) . In addition, testing would be simpler than that for corn because herbicide-tolerant soybeans are the only approved biotech trait. In contrast, shipments of less than 8,000 tons are more common for non-biotech corn and testing for biotech content is more complicated for corn due to different biotech events and the existence of varieties that have not been approved by some importing countries (Sato; Martin).
Shipments of non-biotech corn are thus more likely to have delays in loading onto the vessel, which adds extra opportunity costs (interest expense). Therefore, non-biotech corn shipments would typically add an extra $5 per ton ($0.13 per bushel) of ocean freight expenses from U.S. export ports to Japan, compared with no such additional expense for non-biotech soybeans (Sato) .
The costs of IP also consist of all segregation costs (including hidden costs) at the farm level and incentives offered to producers to grow non-biotech crops. According to USDA's Value 
Price Premiums for Non-biotech Crops
If consumers in some segments of export markets (primarily the EU and Japan) show a preference for non-biotech food products, are they willing to pay premiums for them? This cannot be determined from retail data, because food manufacturers opt to use non-biotech ingredients to avoid labeling. However, it is possible to determine whether Japanese buyers are willing to pay premiums for non-biotech corn and soybeans. In addition, it is feasible to determine if the price premiums are large enough to cover the costs of segregation and to provide incentives to producers for entering into contracts with grain companies to grow non-biotech corn and soybeans.
Theoretical Considerations
Prior to the investigation of price premiums that Japanese buyers are willing to pay for nonbiotech corn and soybeans, it is appropriate to consider related conceptual issues. How does the market equilibrium condition for non-biotech corn or soybeans differ from that for biotech and biotech-commingled varieties? Under what market conditions would buyers pay price premiums for non-biotech corn or soybeans, or even discount biotech products?
The conceptual framework divides U.S. corn or soybean market into two separate, segmented markets: 1) the non-IP market, including biotech products and conventional varieties that are not segregated and thus are commingled with the biotech products; and 2) the IP market, which is reserved exclusively for non-biotech products grown under IP systems. As shown in figure 1, the supply curve for the unsegregated non-biotech product prior to the cost of IP being added is a "kinked" supply curve abf (S nip ), with the flat segment of line ab representing the fact that farmers always have the option of selling their products at the non-IP market for a price (point a).
After adding the cost of IP (distance of line ik) to the supply curve S nip , the supply curve of the non-biotech, IP product becomes another "kinked" supply curve ecg (S ip ). of the non-biotech, IP product instead of selling the product in the non-IP market. The market for the non-biotech product is cleared at the equilibrium price (P ip), which is the vertical sum of the marginal cost of the non-biotech product production (point i) plus the cost of IP (distance of line ik, which is equal to the distance of line ae, or line dj). In other words, the non-biotech product IP market is in equilibrium when the market clearing price, which exceeds that in the non-IP market, is just sufficient to cover the cost of IP and marginal cost of production for the non-biotech product (including incentives offered to producers to grow non-biotech, IP crops).
The equilibrium quantity for the non-biotech product that corresponds to the equilibrium price is Q ip ( fig. 1 ) .
At the above equilibrium quantity and price, producers of non-biotech, IP commodities gain no excess returns beyond covering the marginal cost of production and the cost of IP. In other words, the price premium (P ip -a) for the non-biotech product is sufficient just to cover the cost of IP and marginal cost of production. Given the assumption that producers always have the fallback option to sell in the non-IP market at a price (point a), the "producer premium" for IP production, defined as the difference between the incentive price for IP production and the price received for unsegregated production, has a lower bound of zero. The incentive price for IP production refers to the effective price received by producers after subtracting the cost of IP (distance of line ea) from the price of IP commodities (point e) received by producers. Because the price premium (P ip -a) can also exceed the IP cost, the "producer premium" for IP production, in equilibrium, reflects differences in marginal cost between non-biotech, IP commodities and conventional (but unsegregated) ones, not pure profit for the producer.
The above "producer premium" for the production of non-biotech, IP commodities, will disappear if the demand curve intersects the horizontal section of the supply curve ecg (inclusive of IP costs). The market clearing price for non-biotech, IP commodities is at point e, where producers have no more incentive for IP production than that for conventional (but unsegregated) commodities. Thus, the price premium for non-biotech, IP commodities, in equilibrium, is just sufficient to cover the cost of IP, leaving no "producer premium" for IP production.
Changes in the cost associated with IP (the vertical distance between supply curves) have different impacts, depending on whether the intersection with demand curve occurs on the "flat"
or "diagonal" segment. If it occurs on the flat segment, an increase in IP costs will be borne by consumers. In contrast, if it occurs on the diagonal segment, there will be price changes for both consumers and producers.
The above graphic analysis has a limitation in that it assumes that IP cost can be represented as a fixed parameter. Related to this limitation is that the graph cannot show the incidence of IP costs for grain handlers or shippers. In addition, it assumes uniform cost structures for all producers of non-biotech, IP commodities. Individual producers may have higher or lower costs, depending on farm-specific characteristics and locational factors.
Whether price premiums paid for non-biotech crops exceed the costs of segregation depends on the relative size of the supply of and demand for biotech and non-biotech crops. The market condition under which buyers are more prone to pay price premiums that are just sufficient to cover the costs of segregation is when the supply share of the non-biotech product is larger than the corresponding demand share (Lence and Hayes). At present, the supply share of non-biotech products grown in the United States exceeds their demand share, which is still a niche market, accounting for about 2 percent of domestic corn or soybean production. Hence, price premiums paid for non-biotech crops tend to cover just the costs of segregation. Non-biotech corn or soybeans, if exported, are primarily destined for Japan for food production, which is highly inelastic. 7 The inelastic demand for food corn and soybeans makes it easier for U.S. exporters to pass on the costs of segregation to Japanese buyers as well.
Foreign Non-biotech Premiums
Interviews with a few Japanese grain trading houses, trade associations, and the Japan Ministry Non-biotech soybean futures were launched at Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) in May 2000. These futures prices and those for conventional, unsegregated soybeans permit the calculation of non-biotech premiums. Price premiums at TGE could be influenced by the supply of non-biotech soybeans by grain companies in the real market, which could bias the price discovery process, especially in a short timespan (such as a month or so). However, the premiums at TGE match closely with those obtained from other data sources for the 2000 and 2001 crops. For details of contract specification for non-biotech soybeans at TGE, the reader is referred to a study by Parcell and TGE's web site: http://www.tge.or.jp/cgi-bin/monthly.
non-biotech premiums they were willing to pay amidst indications that the 2002 non-biotech soybean supply was tight, and that U.S. farmers would plant even more herbicide-tolerant soybeans for the 2003 soybean crop. 10 In addition, the hike in non-biotech premiums reflects that U.S. producers and handlers have learned from previous lessons that some IP systems, such as the STS, can be very costly.
Can the Incidence of Segregation Costs be Transferred?
Given the price premiums that Japanese buyers were willing to pay for non-biotech corn and Demand price elasticity of the commodity plays a key role in affecting the distribution of the costs of segregation. If the commodity is less price elastic, either because of strong consumer preference for non-biotech products, a lack of substitutes, or the nature of the commodity's market demand, then suppliers are in a better position to pass on the costs of segregation to consumers. The demands for both food-grade corn and soybeans in Japan are highly inelastic, leading to Japanese consumers' willingness to pay price premiums for non-biotech corn and soybeans. In addition, Japanese consumers regard soybeans from Brazil and Argentina, which have a reddish tint, to be inferior in making tofu. This (somewhat) distaste for South American soybeans makes it easier for U.S. non-biotech soybean suppliers to pass on the costs of segregation in the form of higher prices to consumers without incurring revenue losses.
Based on available evidence, it is clear that in the case of non-biotech corn, Japanese buyers have been willing to pay price premiums ranging from $0.40/bu. to $0.50/bu. in recent years. This level of non-biotech premiums is large enough to cover virtually all IP costs, including additional ocean freight expenses (due to the small shipment volumes that were commonly less than 8,000-9,000 tons), segregation costs from country elevators to export elevators, and price premiums paid to producers (table 2) . Price premiums paid by Japanese buyers were able to cover 93-111 percent of the cost of segregation and producers' non-biotech premium for the 2000 crop.
Similarly, about 89-111 percent and 96-105 percent of the IP costs were covered by premiums paid by Japanese buyers for the 2001 and 2002 crops, respectively. In other words, the incidence This lower coverage range might be attributed to three potential factors. First, in the event that NASS' Illinois Market News overstated producers' non-biotech premiums, the range of IP costs covered by Japanese buyers' premiums would be understated. However, this scenario is regarded as unlikely because the Value Enhanced Grain Survey covered about 75-80 percent of the nonbiotech soybean, IP market in Illinois (English) . Second, while the -0.10 demand price elasticity for food soybeans contributes to the transfer of segregation costs to Japanese buyers, it is less than perfectly inelastic. Hence, the transfer of segregation costs to Japanese buyers would likely be less than 100 percent. Third, although price premiums paid by buyers are reported for a specific crop year, sales are spread over several months after harvest instead of at a specific time.
In the event that market prices for non-biotech products decline due to unforeseen market forces, price premiums paid by Japanese buyers could be lower than U.S. producers and grain handlers were expecting at new crop harvest-time. Given limitations of the available data (which include a number of industry cost estimates and price averages but not data for a complete set of actual transaction within a supply chain), these results should be viewed with some caution.
In contrast, futures trading for the 2002 non-biotech soybean crop at Tokyo Grain Exchange appeared to have adjusted the non-biotech premiums significantly upward toward the end of the futures contracts. As most of the soybean cropland was planted to the herbicide-tolerant soybean variety, non-biotech soybean buyers in Japan had to offer larger premiums to entice U.S. producers to give up the opportunity of growing the biotech variety and to cover costly IP systems. As a result, non-biotech premiums paid by Japanese buyers for the 2002 crop more than adequately covered the costs of IP.
Conclusions
The IP system used to segregate non-biotech corn and soybeans from biotech varieties or biotech-commingled crops is an extension of the handling process that has been employed for value-enhanced commodities. The system evolves over time as the U.S. grain and oilseed industries adapt to the needs of foreign buyers for these niche products. The IP systems discussed in this paper are intended to meet a less stringent, 5-percent tolerance level, not zero tolerance. In addition, these IP systems can be employed for shipments to other export markets besides Japan.
The cost of IP varies, depending upon the requirements of the system. As the grain and oilseed industries adapt to the needs of foreign buyers, more cost-effective IP systems will be adopted by U.S. producers and handlers. In addition, the costs of IP might vary over time, such as in the case of non-biotech soybeans, resulting from the adoption of a less costly IP system. At present, non-biotech corn and soybeans grown and marketed under IP systems remain a niche market--the share of non-biotech corn or soybean demand is small relative to their share of the supply. This market condition implies that the price premium for non-biotech corn or soybeans would tend to equal the cost of IP. The inelastic demand for food corn and soybeans in Japan, which is the sole use of U.S. non-biotech corn and soybeans destined for that country, together with a lack of viable substitutes, make it easier for U.S. grain handlers and exporters to pass on the costs of IP to Japanese buyers.
Evidence available to date suggests that price premiums that Japanese buyers were willing to pay for non-biotech corn and soybeans imported from the United States, by and large, can cover the costs of IP systems. In other words, the incidence of the segregation costs largely falls on non-biotech, IP producers, grain handlers, exporters, or some combination of the three.
However, these results have to be interpreted in an ex post context. In an ex ante sense, farmers can always sell their products at the conventional (but unsegregated) price instead of growing non-biotech, IP crops. In addition, price premium data have their limitations. Although the range of price premiums appears to be convergent from various sources, the number of observations is limited in the absence of a comprehensive survey. The supply of non-biotech
